Big business in the Russian economy and politics under Putin\u2019s rule by Paszyc, Ewa & Wisniewska, Iwona
Big business in the
Russian economy 
and politics under
PutinÕs rule
Ewa Paszyc, Iwona Wiæniewska
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1. The pace of ownership transfer in the Russian economy has
speeded up considerably over the last year. There has been asig-
nificant rise in the number of acquisitions of whole enterprises,
and large blocks of shares in individual firms and plants.
Similarly the number of mergers, bankruptcies and take-overs 
of failing firms by their strongest competitors has grown. 
The ongoing consolidation of individual industrial-financial groups
in Russia, the expansionism inside a specific sector, and the
expansion of activities into other sectors all have their own spe-
cial processes and consequences, both economic and political.
One common feature of these processes is a trend towards mono-
polisation of certain sectors of the economy.
2. As these industrial-financial groups have appeared and trans-
formed themselves, their operational strategy has differed from
that of the mid-1990s oligarchic conglomerates. The policy of
these groupings and holdings has an ever more expedient cha-
racter, aimed at unifying firms and enterprises into a specific
technological cycle, i.e. a process of vertical integration. These
holdings now more rarely demand the tax breaks, privileges and
state guarantees which were so popular in the 1990s, and now
try more frequently to influence the structural changes in the
economy which the government has proposed. At present, their
lobbying is focused on conditions for conducting business in
Russia Ð custom, currency and tax legislation, financial and 
tariff policy, and reform of the natural monopolies. 
3. After Boris YeltsinÕs departure, the Russian business elite was
stripped of its former political status; while the phenomenon of
oligarchy has almost passed away at the federal level. Vladimir
PutinÕs slogan of Ôan equal distance between the oligarchs and
the governmentÕ, as well as the very definite steps taken against
some of them, proved that even the most influential ÔsharksÕ in
Russian business, Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, are
not immune from this process. However, many examples indicate
that among those oligarchs who are Ôequally distantÕ from the
Kremlin, some are Òmore equal than othersÓ. One symbol of the
new privilege is Roman Abramovich, the owner of the Sibnieft oil
company, and a co-owner of the Russian aluminium industry.
4. The most important changes in the relationship between busi-
ness and the government are taking place at the local level. 
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A process is taking place whereby the financial groups are
ÔregionalisingÕ their interests. At present, the business ÔsharksÕ
are moving ever closer to those regions where their most impor-
tant enterprises operate, with the aim of ÔdistancingÕ themselves
from the Kremlin. In some cases, they have not only been Ôhoard-
ingÕ successive plants and branches of industry, but have also
assumed political authority in these regions. As yet, this process
of ÔabsorptionÕ of entire territories by certain oligarchic groups
has only covered the periphery of the Russian Federation Ð
Chukotka, Yakutia, the Taimyr and Evenkia. 
5. In spite of the great autonomy which private business enjoys,
the state has maintained instruments which allow it to control
and regulate economic processes. This especially concerns its
capability to control the most profitable export sectors. Apart from
a few exceptions, the government has generally tried to avoid
conflict with big business, and is broadening its dialogue with the
most important businessmen. 
6. The re-grouping and excessive expansion of the vertically inte-
grated holdings and conglomerates may lead to the creation of
monopolies in entire branches of industry, which will be able to
limit competition and fix prices. Analysts warn that Korean-type
chaebol may appear in Russia, and that these businesses will be
able to dictate terms to the state. Any further limitation of market
competition may be a fundamental problem, which could lead to
greater barriers for firms to develop in new directions, higher
prices for consumers, and a lack of stimulus for Russian compa-
nies to increase their international competitiveness. 
This paper aims at presenting some of the current trends in the
Russian economy, and to examine their influence on the relation-
ship between the government and business under Vladimir
PutinÕs presidency. In this work we have focused on political
problems, and will not analyse more widely the influence any
changes in the structure of business might have on prospects for
RussiaÕs economic growth; for this reason, we will not evaluate
the current changes from that point of view. Neither will we deal
with the functioning of Russian anti-monopoly legislation, nor its
implementation by the respective state organs1.
Private business is the exclusive object of our analysis. The natu-
ral monopolies, which are state-controlled and subordinated to
its requirements Ð those concerning energy (the Unified Energy
Systems of Russia company), gas (Gazprom) and the state rail-
way (MPS) Ð have been deliberately omitted. The natural mono-
polies have not yet been reformed, and have been subjected 
to the changes in the Russian market to arelatively small degree.
To illustrate the processes which the economy is undergoing, the
four biggest groups in the Russian Federation have been chosen
to serve as examples of the different organisational structures
which are transforming their industrial divisions: the Grand
Coalition mega-holding of Roman Abramovich, Oleg Deripaska,
Aleksandr Mamut and Iskander Makhmudov (which deals in
crude oil, aluminium industry, mining, iron works, motor & air
transport, etc.); the oil concern LUKoil, Vladimir PotaninÕs holding
Interros (non-ferrous metal industry, chemical industry, electro-
mechanical, mining, insurance, etc.), and the Alfa Group con-
glomerate of Mikhail Fridman (oil, chemical and agricultural sec-
tors, commerce, banks, insurance, etc.). These are not the only
such groups active on the Russian market, but the scale and
range of the capital they command best illustrate the changes
taking place in the Russian economy.
Stages of consolidation 
in the Russian economy
The great private financial-industrial-media groups were formed
in Russia during the period of privatisation between 1992 and
1997. The state financed and facilitated their creation in different
ways. Many of these groups established conglomerates consist-
ing of firms, plants and enterprises which were acquired at ran-
dom and in an accidental fashion from different sectors, banks
and so on; at that time, most of them were acquired practically
for free 2. This kind of group particularly developed during the so-
called Ôdeposit bidsÕ period between 1995 and 1996, when pri-
vate banks took over blocks of state enterprise shares as
ÔdepositsÕ for making loans to these enterprises. Nevertheless,
many of these loans were sponsored by the state 3. The process
of distributing federal property after Boris YeltsinÕs re-election4
did not motivate most of the new owners, who were interested 
in fast and easy profit, to invest in the development of the enter-
prises they had so cheaply obtained. Only the financial crash 
in Russia (August 1998) brought about a change in attitude; this
caused some commercial banks to go bankrupt, and some indus-
trial private holdings grew both in importance and, gradually, in
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independence, ultimately winning their freedom from the stateÕs
financial and political backing.
After the ownershipÕ transfers, the big enterprises in most sectors
of Russian industry were generally independent until 2000, with
the exception of the fuel and energy sectors; if they entered into
any larger groups, it was on the principle of mutual autonomy.
2001 saw the beginning of their active amalgamation into large
interregional companies covering many sectors of industry. The
companies, holdings and conglomerates created have diverse
structures and natures. Some are integrated vertically, others
focus on different kinds of enterprise; some are subordinated to
a common managerial centre, and others form a loose coalition
of holdings which follow a mutually agreed financial policy.
The operational strategies of the emerging and transforming
industrial-financial groups differ from that of the oligarchic con-
glomerates of the mid-1990s. which accumulated assets of dif-
ferent types almost at random. The holdings and groups operate
an ever more expedient policy, which is aimed at unifying firms
and enterprises into a specific technological cycle, i.e. a process
of vertical integration. The process of consolidating the private
industrial-financial groupsÕ assets differs from case to case, but
expansion is always the ultimate goal Ð either within the confines
of a specific sector of the economy, or with the aim of expanding
activity into other sectors. The trend to monopolising individual
branches of the economy was common practice for those groups
which are consolidating themselves and those which are broad-
ening the scope of their activities. This is an on-going process,
and the structure of both the holdings and the individual sectors
of the Russian economy may yet undergo many more changes. 
The biggest private companies
1. Mega-holdings Ð the Grand Coalition
(Abramovich & Deripaska)
Among the great industrial-financial Russian groups, the Grand
Coalition is exceptional in both its scale and the range of its
expansion. The Coalition is agroup of enterprises, firms, holdings
and companies controlled by several capital groups. Within are-
latively short time, its heads and co-owners have managed to
take control of aconsiderable part of various important sectors of
the Russian economy. This most expansive of the Russian mega-
holdings began to form in spring 2000, when the so-called
Sibnieft shareholders (Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich)
took over the British Trans World GroupÕs shares in the Russian
aluminium industry). Then they arranged a merger with Oleg
DeripaskaÕs Sibirsky Aluminium holding, as a result of which the
Russian Aluminium (Russky Alumini) holding emerged. At pre-
sent, after the affiliation of Aleksandr MamutÕs banking-industri-
al group MDM and Iskander MakhmudovÕs copper holding to the
Abramovich-Deripaska tandem, the Grand CoalitionÕs expansion
has widened into the fields of the copper and iron industry, coal,
transport, heavy machines, aircraft, energy, the banking sector
and more. The Grand Coalition, which in Russia is exceeded only
by Gazprom and LUKoil in terms of the scope of its business
interests, consists of dozens of companies, each of which has
a clearly defined profile of production, its own management,
banks and insurance companies. They are linked by the Coalition
empireÕs common ownership of the individual segments, and by
an agreed policy of funding the firmsÕ and plantsÕ most important
technological purchases. 
The bedrock of the most profitable ÔaluminiumÕ part of the group
(which exports over 80% of its production to European and
American states) is Russian Aluminium (RusAl), which is con-
trolled by Oleg Deripaska. This company manufactures around
75% of the aluminium produced in Russia, and is the worldÕs
second biggest aluminium producer after the international corpo-
ration Alcoa. Russian Aluminium has absorbed the biggest plants
in this sector in the Russian Federation (the aluminium works in
Krasnoyarsk, Bratsk, Sayansk and Novokuznetsk), as well as the
main plants for fabricating (which is the aluminium industryÕs
basic raw material) in Russia and the CIS states5. The holdingÕs
foreign activity has stimulated a bauxite deficit in the Russian
Federation. RusAl imports some of the raw material from Guinea
(where it has bought up considerable shares in the bauxite
mines), and from Australia. RusAl is also a shareholder in the
biggest hydroelectric power plants in the Russian Federation, in
Irkutsk (around 30%) and Bratsk (around 70%), as well as
smaller groups of other Siberian power plants stations. As of now
(2002), RusAl is completing the formation of the Eurosibenergo
energy holding, which will directly or indirectly control 50% of the
energy generated in the region of eastern Siberia. Six firms regis-
tered on the Virgin Islands are RusAlÕs formal owners. 
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The ÔpetroleumÕ part of the group is the Siberian Oil Company
(Sibnieft), which is the seventh largest Russian oil group in terms
of extraction (around 18m tonnes a year in 2000). The company
is vertically integrated, and comprises extraction enterprises and
refineries. The company also owns shares in several petrochem-
ical plants. SibnieftÕs nominal owners are numerous firms regis-
tered in Cyprus, the Virgin Islands, Gibraltar and so on. After
absorbing the Eastern Siberian Oil Company in 1997, Sibnieft has
been fairly passive in increasing its share of the oil sector in com-
parison with other Russian groups; however, we should consider
the recent purchase (December 2001) from LUKoil of a package
of 35% of the shares in the Russian FederationÕs most modern
refinery in Moscow6. However, this passivity is merely superficial.
In accordance with the principle of his former partner Boris
Berezovsky, the companyÕs present owner Roman Abramovich
will not waste money on buying something he can have for free.
For example, thanks to his lobbying skills, Abramovich took con-
trol over the export and finances of the state company Slavnieft
towards the end of 20007, and has been efficiently delaying the
governmentÕs plan for its privatisation for three years. 
The representative of the coalitionÕs ÔcopperÕ part is Iskander 
M a k h m u d o v. His branch consists of two holdings: the Ural Mining-
-Metallurgy Company (UKGM; iron ore, copper and iron production)
and Eurazholding (iron production, coal mining). As in the cases 
of the Russian Aluminium and Sibnieft holdings, the main 
s h a r e h o l d e r s are anonymous off-shore firms. The UKGM mines, 
the iron-ore enrichment plants and smelting works control over
40% of ore mining in the Russian Federation. They are also 
responsible for around 30% of the copper produced in the
Russian Federation. 
Eurazholding emerged after taking over the Ku z n e t s k
Metallurgical Combine, as well as shares in the Western Siberian
and Nizhnyetagilski metal combines8, from its competitors. In Fe-
bruary 2002 Eurazholding absorbed another ÔacquisitionÕ, the
Nowolipietsk Metallurgical Combine, which has been renamed
Russian Steel. The formation of both holdings was accompanied
by well-publicised scandals. An insignificant proportion of the
plants and firms which it currently includes has been bought up;
most of it was acquired either by forced bankruptcy or by force
with the use of local courts, the police and special services, and
was aided by disinformation campaigns in the press.
The banking part of the coalition, whose backbone is MDM-Bank,
is controlled by Aleksandr Mamut, head of the MDM financial-
industrial group; during YeltsinÕs second term he gained the nick-
name of the ÔfamilyÕs bankerÕ9. After this period, MDM-Bank
inherited full financial control of the Russian FederationÕs state
atomic industry, among other interests. MDMÕs branches Ð the
Techsnabeksport bank10 and the official state bank of the atomic
enterprise Konversbank (both of which are administered by MDM
managers) Ð are the media for all settlement of accounts in this
sector. The MDM group also owns shares in many Russian insur-
ance companies, including a controlling share in one of RussiaÕs
biggest companies, RESO-Garantiya (RG). The majority of RGÕs
accounts have been transferred to MDM-Bank. 
MDM-Bank not only participates actively in the CoalitionÕs joint
ventures, by co-funding or making loans to profitable ventures,
but has also been creating its own industrial base. In 2000 the
group began to stockpile shares in plants producing ball-bearings,
using various means (purchasing, bankruptcy, exchange for other
shares or introducing its own people into management boards).
A year later, it created the European Bearings Corporation hold-
ing, which controls over 50% of the Russian ball-bearing market. 
Apart from the above-mentioned domains, the Coalition has been
actively expanding its activity in other sectors of the economy.
Abramovich and Deripaska jointly own a 26% share in the airline
Aeroflot. The groupÕs aerial sector will soon increase its shares in
the Domodyedovskie airline by 50%. The Coalition has already
announced that it will participate in the privatisation of this e n t e r-
prise, which is scheduled for 20021 1. As for its newest acqui-
sitions, the group is currently co-opting the Ruspromavto motor
holding, which was created towards the end of 1999; it produces
private and delivery vehicles, buses, road-works and construc-
tion machines, engines and car parts at the GAZ Gorkovsk Auto
Factory, one of the biggest in Russia. During 2001, the Coalition
also began to create an airline holding (Aviaresursholding) its aim
being to deal with the production and repair of aircraft equipment,
and the production of aircraft fuel, lubrication & air-pressure sys-
tems. Furthermore, the Grand CoalitionÕs structure includes also
a multi-sector conglomerate, SoyuzMetallResurs, which pro-
duces universal containers, railroad cars & platforms, copper and
molybdenum concentrates and coal mines), a timber holding,
food processing plants (including Omski Bekon) and more. 
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2. Centralised holdings Ð the Interros
group (Vladimir Potanin)
The Interros financial-industrial group is substantially different
from the Grand Coalition regarding its centralised administrative
structures, and the fact that it has been subordinated to one per-
son Ð Vladimir Potanin. 
InterrosÕ concerns are industrial activity, investment and foreign
cooperation in such sectors as energy, mining and processing
non-ferrous metal, the chemical and electromechanical indus-
tries, insurance, and most recently even agriculture and the food
industry. PotaninÕs group is also a shareholder in several mass-
media organisations, including the newspapers I z v e s t i a,
Sovietski Sport and Komsomolskaya Pravda, the weekly maga-
zine Ekspert, the information agency Prajm TASS and the radio
stations Europe-Plus and Novosti On-Line. 
The centres of the financial group are Rosbank12 and the Re-
naissance MFK international financial corporation. At the moment
Rosbank is being strengthened on the Russian market. Interros
representatives have even suggested that in the short term the
holdingÕs two main banks Rosbank & MFK could merge, which
would help to boost the investment groupÕs potential. 
The holdingÕs basis in the industrial market sector is Norilsk
Nickel Joint Stock Company, which is essentially the monopolist
on the Russian nickel and platinum market. Norilsk Nickel is
responsible for 50% of world platinoid production and 20% of
nickel production; it exports over half of its production of nickel
and copper. This nickel-mining and metallurgy combine contains
enterprises which cover the whole production cycle, from scien-
tific research institutes through to extracting and processing the
ore. Owing to its strategic partnership13 with Norilsk Gazprom, NN
is assured of stable power supplies for its production, and thanks
to its own harbours, river and sea fleet14 it has its own transport
network at its disposal. 
Norilsk Nickel is also actively involved on the international marke t .
In June 2000, it began creating its own overseas sales network by
buying up shares in two non-ferrous metal companies, British
Norimet and Almaz of the USA. It has been simultaneously nego-
tiating the purchase of shares in a New Caledonia nickel mine.
Interros is also an active participant in the electromechanical
market. In mid-2001, by subordinating the Elektrosila enterprise,
which is part of the Power Machines (Silovye Mashiny) consor-
tium, it ended a three-year battle for all-out control of all the
enterprises concentrated in this holding. Furthermore, Interros is
a shareholder in the Piermskiye Motory company (PM), and also in
enterprises of the Perm machine industry which PM administers.
In 2001 PotaninÕs group expanded its activity into the agricultural
sector. In mid-October of the same year Interros registered anew
enterprise, the Agros Agro-Industrial Complex. This company will
deal both with the cultivation of plants and the breeding of ani-
mals as a processor of farm products. 
3. Vertically integrated groups Ð LUKoil 
The process of vertical integration was begun in Russia by those
companies which succeeded in accumulating the most money,
namely the oil companies. Since their establishment, the strongest
of them have been buying up, absorbing, bankrupting and taking
over smaller companies, mining enterprises, refineries, licences
and so on. The leader of the Russian ÔnieftiankaÕ (the oil sector)
is LUKoil, the biggest oil company in Russia in every way Ð by
amount extracted (it is responsible for over 20% of all oil extract-
ed in the Russian Federation), by stocks, amount refined and
exported, local and foreign investment. It is the worldÕs sixth
largest company by amount of daily extraction15. Its most recent
acquisitions were the oil companies KomiTEK in 1999, and
NORSI-oil in October 2001. 
LUKoil is also one of the few genuinely transnational Russian cor-
porations. It participates in international oil groups in the Caspian
region, Iraq, Iran and Africa. The group owns refineries, petro-
chemical plants and sales enterprises in the CIS states, the Baltic
republics and the Balkans, as well as filling stations in Russia
and abroad, including the USA and Canada. Overseas refinery
and petrochemical plants owned by LUKoil, including in Bulgaria
and Romania, create over 25% of the oil products produced by
the company. In the near future, LUKoil intends to increase this
figure to 40% since, as LUKoil chief Vagit Alekpierov has stated,
the reprocessing of oil and marketing oil products abroad is more
profitable for Russian companies than exporting raw materials. In
connection with this, the companyÕs plans include the acquisition
of new processing plants and the expansion of its filling stationsÕ
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network in central and western Europe. The purchase of a share
package in the Austrian firm Avanti GmbH (a filling station net-
work in western Europe) is presently under negotiation. LUKoil
also declared that it will bid for a 23-percent share in the Greek
petroleum company Hellenic Petroleum. The companyÕs opera-
tions in Europe are coordinated by LUKoil Europe, a company cre-
ated in January 2001 and registered in London. LUKoil offices will
be located in most oil-producing states. 
The first Russian oil concern is the backbone of the financial
group, which until recently consisted of fifteen regional and three
national banks16, and the East-West United Bank (USA, 49%).
LUKoilÕs banking sector ended this process of agglomeration in
November 2001. At present, the companyÕs main bank and coor-
dinator of its financial transactions is Petrokommertzbank, which
also owns fourteen regional bank branches. During the course of
final negotiations, in February 2002 a controlling share was pur-
chased of the Kiev bank Aviatek and its branch in Odessa; this
latter could serve the Odessa Refineries belonging to the Russian
concern. A separate part of the concernÕs financial group consists
of funds and investment companies (LUKoil-Fond & LUKoil-
Reserve-Invest), retirement funds (LUKoil-Garant & Nikoil) and
actuarial agencies (LUKoil-Miedved and others). 
LUKoil furthermore owns an extensive transport section, founded
on two firms: LUKoil-Trans, which coordinates rail transportation
of the concernÕs cargoes and administers the wagon, container
and tanker parks it owns; and LUKoil-Flot, which administers the
concernÕs fleet, which presently numbers 54 units of different
classes (including several tankers and three ice-breakers)17.
Shipyards in Saint Petersburg and Germany are currently building
a further 10 tankers ordered by LUKoil. 
The concernÕs transport section will soon include a trans-ship-
ping base built near Murmansk by LUKoil. Petroleum will be
transported in high-displacement tankers to Rotterdam and the
USA from this first private terminal in Russia. In 2001, while test-
ing the equipment so far installed at the base, the company dis-
patched its first 7 tankers (each with a displacement of around
15,000 tonnes). 
4. Conglomerates Ð Alfa Group 
Alfa is one of the biggest private financial-industrial groups in
Russia. The firms which formed this consortium emerged in the
early 1990s. The Alfa Group, which from its inception has been
led by Mikhail Fridman, expanded in the first years of Russian pri-
vatisation. Then in 1997 it received a bonus for its financial
involvement in Boris YeltsinÕs electoral campaign, in the form of
shares in the Tyumen Oil Company TNK18. Presently the Alfa Group
deals with industrial activity not only in petroleum, but also in the
chemical and agricultural sectors. It sells its products mainly
through its own sales network, both wholesale and retail. The
consortium is also a strong presence in the Russian banking and
actuarial sectors. The Alfa Group is active in the markets in Ru s s i a
and the CIS states (principally in Kazakhstan and Ukraine). 
Since the moment of its creation in 1996, the groupÕs corporate
centre has been the CTF holding, which manages the assets of
the whole group. 
The consortiumÕs financial-investment centre is Alfa-Bank, one of
the biggest private banks in Ru s s i a1 9, as well as several smaller
banks, such as Alfa-Bank Bashkrtstan (Bashkiria). 
Since October 2001, several insurance companies (VESTA, Alfa-
-Garantii, Ostra-Kiev) have come together under one common
name AlfaInsurance (Alfa-Strakhovanie); these companies were
either formed earlier or bought up by the group. AlfaInsurance is
now one of the five biggest underwriters of voluntary insurance on
the Russian market.
The industrial sector is primarily represented in the group by the
vertically integrated oil concern TNK20. TNK deals with both
extracting and processing oil, as well as the sale of crude oil and
oil products. 97% of its shares are presently in the hands of two
o f f -shore Cypriot firms, TNK Novy Investment and Novy
Petroleum Finance. Both firms represent the interests of the Alfa
Group and ZAO Renova, 50% each). 
The process by which TNK took over its branches (extraction
companies) ended in December 2001. As a result of the conver-
sion of the shares, the participation of minority shareholders in
these firms has been considerably limited. 
In September 2000 Alfa won abid for an 85% share in the ONAKO
Oil Company, whereas in mid-2001 TNK additionally bought up
44% of the shares of another oil company, SIDANKO, from
Interros. TNK also owns shares in Ural Oil Company (51%), and
in the Russian-Belarussian oil company Slavnieft (12.58%). 
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Sales of crude oil and oil products for the Alfa Group are dealt
with by two firms registered in London, Crown Resources AG21 and
Alfa-Eko. The latter is also an important importer of sugar and tea
in Russia. 
The consortium also owns cement factories, distilleries, chemical
enterprises, the Perekriostok network of Moscow supermarkets,
and the United Food Company, which makes food and agricultural
products (mainly sugar and cereals), and intends ultimately to
form an agricultural-industrial enterprise covering the whole pro-
duction cycle. 
The Alfa Group is also active on the telecommunication market.
In April 2001 it took over a43.8% share in Golden Telecom, which
owns a controlling share in the biggest internet providers in
Russia, Rossija-online and Cityline, and a 50% share of the
phone network operator Sovintel. At the end of May 2001, the
group also took over a blocking share in VimpelCom, a cellular
network operator.
Change in the industrial groupsÕ
methods of operation
In the USSR, the management of individual enterprises proceed-
ed outside their gates; such matters as the reason for a compa-
nyÕs existence, its specialisation, admissible costs, profits and so
on, were in general decided at the central level. One result of the
creation of the great capital-industrial groups and companies
during the Russian privatisation period in the 1990s was the
decentralisation of management. The newly emerged groups ini-
tially decided the economic strategy of the individual companies
which they incorporated; they consolidated their finances and
administered them by using Ôadministrative stocksÕ thanks to their
links with the government. The banks which formed the core of
such financial groups then bought up dirt-cheap or absorbed
e v e r y t h i n g, from mines and refineries to bakeries. Their structures
were not integrated, and their managers were largely incompetent,
looking to make immediate, large profits without any expenditure.
After overcoming the results of the 1998 crisis, those who sur-
vived continued to stockpile assets, but towards the end of 1999
their purchases or sale of shares or even whole enterprises began
to take on a more purposeful character. The holdings accumulat-
ed firms and enterprises which in effect created a defined tech-
nological cycle, for example from mining the raw material to the
production and sale of the final product. At the same time, the
groupsÕ powers have been increasingly limited to managing their
capital (by strategic alliances, searching for foreign investors and
so on). The taking of economic decisions and the direction of the
production processes now take place at the level of the company.
The holdings are increasingly uninterested in obtaining the same
tax breaks, privileges and state guarantees which were so popu-
lar in the 1990s; they are increasingly focused on influencing the
structural changes to the economy which the government has
proposed. Their lobbying is aimed at changing the current condi-
tions under which business in Russia is conducted: this concerns
legislation regarding tax, customs, currency, financial and tariff
policy, and reforming the naturalmonopolies. 
The ability of the capital groups and integrated companies to bring
about such changes is exemplified by the fact that the reform of
the energy monopoly RAO- U E S, whose holdings are decidedly
opposed to it, has been delayed by a year; also, many important
changes have been introduced to the text of the already approved
plan, which will hinder the radical restructuring of the sector.
So far, the main source of revenue for the Russian industrial
empires has been export. If Russian commodities can really be
called competitive, then this is principally because their prices
are lower than those in the rest of the world. As Boris Grozovsky
writes (Polit.ru, 25 June 2001), Russian producers do not so
much export steel or nitrogen fertiliser as they do cheap electric
power and almost free gas. This is why the holdings have reacted
so sensitively to the stateÕs tariff policy. The considerable rises in
the prices of electricity, gas and rail transport Ð which are essen-
tial elements in reforming the natural monopolies Ð could serio-
usly shake the foundations of many Russian industrial empires.
Relations between government
and business
The history of the current relationship between business and gov-
ernment in Russia can be conventionally divided into three peri-
ods. Before 1996 (YeltsinÕs election), the Russian financial elite
were assured of the existence and development subsistence by
their close links with the central government. The sponsorÕs role
in this system fell to the state structures, which in various ways
Ð including a system of discounts and privileges for selected
ÔclientsÕ Ð financed and stimulated the creation of the financial-
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-industrial groups. In the next stage (1996Ð1998), the role played
by the already formed private business elites in Boris YeltsinÕs
electoral victory was reversed; the financial groups ceased to be
manageable clients of the state administration, and began dic-
tating their own terms. The so-called Ômixed-interestÕ groups also
appeared at this time, which unified influential representatives of
state structures and the ÔsharksÕ of Russian business22. The
financial crash in Russia (1998) negatively verified both the sta-
bility of this relationship and the economic strength of the indus-
trial empires, and especially their financial segments, as many
private commercial banks went bankrupt. Between 1998Ð2000,
the powerful Russian capital groups lost some of their political
influence23; however, many of them have survived and have
maintained their links with the government elites. 
Vladimir PutinÕs accession to the presidency in March 2000 saw
the start of the next period in government-business relations. 
The stateÕs notably greater independence is an important change
in this relationship, in comparison with the previous periods.
Presidential authority has been reinforced; the Kremlin, which felt
no pre-electoral obligations to big business, has succeeded in
taking the initiative. The oligarchs have been stripped of their for-
mer political status, and at the same time the phenomenon of oli-
garchy has almost completely passed away at the federal level.
Vladimir PutinÕs slogan of Ôan equal distance between the oli-
garchs and the governmentÕ, as well as the very definite steps
taken against some of them, (for example Vladimir Gusinsky and
his Most media empire), have demonstrated that not even the
most influential potentates have immunity. The KremlinÕs anti-
oligarchic campaign was in principle directed only against two
representatives of this class, namely Gusinsky and Boris
Berezovsky, the Yeltsin ÔcourtÕs éminence grise. However, its re-
sult has been to deprive the whole group of its influence on the
most important media24.
At the same time however, a considerable part of the financial
elite has not only maintained its place in the Russian economy,
but has gained even greater independence and considerably
strengthened its position. It seems that the central government is
still searching for amodel of relations with business which will be
adequate to Russian reality. At present, an important condition (if
not the principal one) deciding the prosperity (or failure) of indi-
vidual private capital groups is the degree of their loyalty to the
Kremlin. The concept of loyalty has at any rate a fairly broad def-
inition in the Kremlin; as the recent well-publicised case of the
SIBUR chemical holding has proved, President Putin also consid-
ers both the attempt and the fact of transferring state assets to
private firms as political disloyalty25. However, the governmentÕs
generally positive attitude to loyal businesses is demonstrated by
PutinÕs declaration that there will be no revision of the results of
privatisation26.
Despite the great autonomy which private business enjoys, the
state has kept certain instruments of control which allow it to reg-
ulate economic processes. This especially concerns its ability to
control the most profitable export sectors. Apart from the general
world-wide mechanisms which regulate local export and economy
(tax policy, granting licenses and so on), the Russian Federation
also employs specifically Russian ways of regulation (the top-
down establishment of rates and export duties, the legal and fis-
cal mechanisms which ensure the supply of cheap energy on the
internal market, and so on). The stateÕs monopoly on establish-
ing energy and transport prices is also an important instrument
of control27. The government is attempting to take advantage of its
position by obliging private or partially private business to spon-
sor the stateÕs requirements (such as loans in the form of cheap
supplies of oil products for agriculture, partially free supplies of
electric power and gas for state-run institutions, and so on). 
At the same time, the Kremlin has tried (with a few exceptions)
to avoid conflicts with big business, and its dialogue with the
biggest businessmen is expanding. The government has elevated
the Russian Association of Industrialists and Businessmen
(RSPP), which represents the private enterprise elite, to the rank
of an institutional intermediary in its relations with business.
This, together with this bodyÕs direct contact with the Kremlin and
the government28, is one element of the new model of the govern-
mentÕs relationship to loyal businesses. Consultations regarding
concrete matters of economic policy between the stateÕs repre-
sentatives and business are even more frequent than under
YeltsinÕs government. The stateÕs policy towards the big industri-
al groups is often based on a search for a compromise regarding
taxes and access to export29; however, the state always has the
final word in these matters. The government has not given up its
attempts to pressurise those concerns who are inclined to man-
age their resources more effectively (for example, by withdrawing
unused licenses), making their finances more transparent, and
transactions linked with transfers of ownership. 
Many examples prove that, among those oligarchs who are Ôequal-
ly distantÕ from the Kremlin, some are more equal than others.
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One symbol of the new privileges (and the lightning rise in for-
tunes of the Russian businesses linked to them) is the governor
general of Chukotka, Roman Abramovich Ð one of the creators of
the Grand Coalition30. However, it is as yet difficult to define which
criteria the government employs in choosing the ÔleadersÕ of this
environment. 
The ÔregionalisationÕ 
of the oligarchsÕ interests
Recently the most important changes in the relationship between
government and business have been taking place at the local
level. Analysts have called attention to a relatively new phenom-
enon in this relationship Ð the ongoing process of ÔregionalisationÕ
which these financial groups are undergoing31. Most of the oli-
garchic conglomerates which took shape in the early 1990s treat-
ed as colonies those areas where they swallowed up the indus-
trial enterprises. The new ownersÕ interests were concentrated in
Moscow, on which the success of their ventures depended. At
present, as part of the process of ÔdistancingÕ themselves from
the Kremlin, the business ÔsharksÕ have been moving ever closer
to the regions where their most important enterprises operate. In
some cases, the groups have not only been heaping up more
plants and industrial sectors in these regions, but have also taken
over political authority there. As yet, this process has only cov-
ered the periphery of the Russian Federation; the Grand Coalition
has absorbed Chukotka, the oil company Yukos runs the Evenki
autonomous okrug, and Norilsk Nickel runs the Taimyr32. The most
spectacular acts of dividing up Russia into regional zones of influ-
ence Ð the acceptance of direct gubernatorial rule by big busi-
ness representatives and local potentates33 Ð is merely a part of
this process. With the aim of strengthening their position in the
regions, the oligarchs have been exerting ever greater influence on
the results of gubernatorial elections in the bigger territorial units,
and within the personnel of local organs of legislative and execu-
tive government. Another visible effect of the common oligarch-
gubernatorial staffing policy is the composition of the Federation
Council, which has the reputation of being a lobbyistÕs clubÕ34.
Almost one-third of the regional representatives in the upper
chamber of the Russian parliament are managers of private
enterprises; they are delegated to local parliaments or adminis-
trations, and only then to the Federation Council. Likewise in the
Duma, several inter-party lobbying groups operate, among whom
the most numerous and influential is the ÔRussiaÕs EnergyÕ group,
which represents the interests of the fuel and energy complex35.
Possible consequences 
of structural changes 
to the Russian economy
The growth in the number and significance of the interregional
companies in most branches of the so-called Ôreal sectorÕ, and
the decrease in the number and significance of independent
enterprises, is one of the most important processes presently
taking place in Russian big business. The aggregation and exces-
sive expansion of vertically integrated holdings and conglomer-
ates may result in the emergence of monopolies which cover
whole branches of industry, ultimately eliminating all competition
and deciding all prices36.
Moscow is attempting to maintain political and economic control
over the economy, but at the same time much indicates that it
does not want total subordination of local business. Its constant
policy, as mentioned above, consists of a system of consultation
between the highest organs of state authority and representative
organisations of the industrial circles. Increasingly frequently, the
Kremlin and government are playing the role of arbiter in conflicts
between interest groups. 
After dealing with the political autonomy of the media empires of
Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky in 2000Ð2001, the
Kremlin has supported the expansionism of capital groups in the
regions. Those of the former oligarchs who have been able to
accommodate the demands of the new relationship between gov-
ernment and business as proposed by Putin, and who have sur-
rendered all their excessive political ambitions, can count on the
governmentÕs support. An example of this is the presidentÕs
promise of ÔindulgenceÕ in the matter of controversial privatisa-
tion transactions, and his tolerance of violations of anti-monop-
oly legislation. The Kremlin has also supported foreign expansion
by the ÔsharksÕ of Russian business. Representatives of RussiaÕs
financial elites almost always accompany Vladimir Putin on his
foreign visits . On such occasions President Putin, as well as
prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, often address their audiences
as if they were spokesmen for local private companies. 
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As a result of the creation of the large interregional companies,
the greatest changes in government-business relations can be
seen at the local level. For independent enterprises, the authori-
ties of individual Federal areas where the enterprises operate are
serious partners, irrespective of whether they own shares in them
or not. The amalgamation of companies into groups which are not
linked to specific regions alters their relations with the federal
authorities. On one hand, this reduces the influence regional
directors have on the companiesÕ policies, which by extension
deprives the governors of some of their economic authority. On
the other hand, the process taking place in the Ru s s i a n
Federation whereby representatives of Russian business take
control of the regions important to them, either by direct or indi-
rect participation in creating local organs of authority, subordi-
nates regional political elites ever more to the private corpora-
tions. As yet, the Kremlin has not interfered in this process, and
in specific cases has limited itself to a mediating role. In the
meantime, the large interregional companies associated with the
federal government are able to counteract separatist tendencies
in the regions. But they can also exacerbate them, as recent
events in the Krasnoyarsk area would seem to confirm; this was
linked to the financial ÔsecessionÕ of the Taimyr37, which proved
that the interests of the economic capital groups are moving
political events in the regions. Analysts warn38 that the ever
greater concentration and monopolisation of the Russian econo-
my, together with the ÔannexationÕ of whole regions, may lead to
the appearance in Russia of Korean-style chaebol. This could
lead to situations in which the state will have to give way to the
interests of big business. 
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Political links:
Potanin was linked 
to so-called reformers 
(including Chubais and Nemtsov), 
and currently has strong influence
in Krasnoyarsk region
I N T E R R O S
Leader:
Vladimir Potanin
Industrial sector:
RAO Norilsk Nickel,
ÔPower MachinesÕ
Financial sector:
Rosbank,
MFK Bank
Political links:
üUKoil at KremlinÕs suggestions
has caused the collapse 
of the TV-6 station
L U Ko i l
Leader:
Vagit Alekperov
Industrial sector:
oil and gas pools, 
refineries, 
petrochemical plants, 
wholesale and retail networks
Financial sector:
Petrokommertzbank,
üUKoil-Garant,
üUKoil-Reserve-Invest
Political links:
This Group expanded 
thanks to its strong ties 
to B. YeltsinÕs ÔteamÕ
A l f a -G r o u p
Leader:
Michai¸ Fridman
Industrial sector:
The Tyumen Oil Company (TNK),
ONAKO Oil Company,
SIDANKO Oil Company
Financial sector:
Alfa-Bank,
AlfaInsurance
Political links:
Abramovich was closely linked to
B. Yeltsin ÔteamÕ, and is currently
governor of Chukotka. 
Mamut was defined as the
ÔFamilyÕs bankerÕ.
THE GRAND COALITION 
Leaders:
Roman Abramovich, 
Oleg Deripaska,
Aleksander Mamut,
Iskander Makhmudov
Industrial sector:
Russian Aluminium (RusAl),
SibnieftÕ, The Ural Mining-
-Metallurgy Company,
Eurazholding,
Ruspromavto
Financial sector:
MDM-Bank,
RESO-Garantiya (RG)
